Cuando se leen los relatos que los grandes santos hacen de su experiencia de Dios, encontramos expresiones que rompen las reglas de la lógica lingüística, prueba de que hay experiencias que no son fáciles de describir y transmitir. San Agustín, en el contexto de una de las más célebres páginas de sus Confesiones, esa en la que exclama: “Tarde te amé, hermosura tan antigua y siempre nueva”, dice, por una parte, que Dios está “dentro” de él, para añadir a renglón (...) seguido que las cosas están dentro de Dios, pues si no estuvieran en él, no serían. En San Pablo encontramos expresiones similares: por una parte, se puede leer en sus cartas que “Cristo vive en mí”, y por otra, el autor de los Hechos de los Apóstoles pone en su boca que “en Dios vivimos, nos movemos y somos”. Este doble modo de concebir la relación de Dios con la realidad creada, con el cosmos y con el ser humano, resulta paradójico y es una provocación para el pensamiento.¿Dios está en la realidad, se hace presente en ella de algún modo, o es más bien la realidad la que está en Dios? Posiblemente no hay contradicción entre ambas imágenes, sino complementariedad. Tomás de Aquino, como veremos, afirma las dos cosas. Dios es de una naturaleza tal que, por una parte puede hacerse presente en la realidad mundana y humana y, por otra, llevar dentro de sí estas mismas realidades. ¿Hay alguna analogía, alguna imagen que pueda servir para describir una naturaleza así y ayudarnos a comprender mejor el ser divino? En definitiva, ¿qué significa “estar en” o “dentro de” las criaturas por parte de Dios y en o dentro de Dios por parte de las criaturas? ¿Se trata de simples imágenes o estas imágenes son modelos que tienen alguna correspondencia con la realidad?When you read the accounts that the great saints do of their experience of God, you find expressions that break the rules of linguistic logic, what proves that there are experiences not easy to describe and transmit. St Augustine in the context of one of the most known pages of his Confessions, where he exclaims: “Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new”, says that God is inside him and adds immediately after that things are inside God, since if things were not in him they wouldn’t exist. We find similar expressions in St Paul: On the one hand, one can read in one of his letters: “Christ lives in me”, on the other hand, the author of the Acts of the Apostles puts in his mouth: “in God we live and move and have our being”. This double way of understanding God’s relation to created things, the cosmos and human beings, is paradoxical and becomes a provocation to reason.Is God inside reality, is he present in it someway, or is rather reality which is in God? Possibly there is not contradiction between the two images, but they complement each other. Thomas Aquinas, as we’ll see later, states the two. God is such a nature, that, on the one hand, he can be present in wordly and human reality, on the other hand, he can contain inside himself these realities. Is there any analogy, any image able to describe a nature like this that could help us to understand better his divine being? In short, what does it mean to be in or inside the creatures in relation to God and to be in or inside God in relation to creatures? Is it about simple images or these images are models with some relation to reality? (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino comienza su síntesis teológica definitiva preguntándose por la legitimidad y necesidad de la teología. Inmediatamente después se plantea la pregunta por sus contenidos: ¿de qué trata la ciencia teológica? Si la teología es la ciencia de la Revelación y su fundamento está en la revelación que Dios en Cristo hace de sí mismo, parece que su contenido tiene que ser Dios mismo. Un contenido que solo es cognoscible si Dios se da a conocer, porque el ser humano, (...) con sus fuerzas, con su sola razón, solo puede alcanzarle de forma limitada y parcial, en suma, solo puede saber de su existencia, pero no de sus designios, de sus intenciones y mucho menos de su naturaleza.Para Sto. Tomás es claro que Dios es el sujeto, el contenido de la Teología. Esta ciencia es un “tratado sobre Dios”. Ahora bien, Tomás de Aquino es consciente de una dificultad: si el fundamento de la Teología es la Sagrada Escritura, que es el lugar en el que se contiene la Revelación de Dios, resulta que “en la Sagrada Escritura se trata de muchas cosas además de Dios, como son las criaturas y los actos humanos”. Tomás de Aquino resuelve la dificultad argumentando que Dios es el sujeto de la teología no exactamente por ser su único contenido o por ser el único sujeto del que trata esta ciencia, sino porque todo lo que ella trata “lo hace teniendo como punto de mira a Dios, bien porque se trata de Dios mismo, bien porque se trata de algo referido a él como principio y como fin”.Thomas Aquinas begins his definitive theological synthesis asking for legitimacy and need of theology. Immediately he asks for the contents: what is theological science about? If theology is the science of Revelation, and its foundation is the revelation that God makes of himself in Christ, it seems that its content must be God himself1. A content that can only be known, if God shows himself, because a human being, with its strength and its sole mind, only can get him in a limited and partial way, in short, it can only know of his existence, but not his plans, his intentions, and even less, his nature.For St Thomas it is clear that God is the subject, the content of theology. This science is a “treatise about God”. However, Thomas Aquinas is conscious of a difficulty: If Sacred Scripture that is the place where God’s revelation is contained, is the foundation of theology, “it turns out that Sacred Scripture deals with many more things besides God, that is, creatures and human acts”. Thomas Aquinas will solve this difficulty arguing that God is the subject of theology not because he is exactly the only content or subject of this science, but because all it deals with, “is done with reference to God himself either because it is about God or about something referred to God as beginning and end”. (shrink)

Cuando se leen los relatos que los grandes santos hacen de su experiencia de Dios, encontramos expresiones que rompen las reglas de la lógica lingüística, prueba de que hay experiencias que no son fáciles de describir y transmitir. San Agustín, en el contexto de una de las más célebres páginas de sus Confesiones, esa en la que exclama: “Tarde te amé, hermosura tan antigua y siempre nueva”, dice, por una parte, que Dios está “dentro” de él, para añadir a renglón (...) seguido que las cosas están dentro de Dios, pues si no estuvieran en él, no serían . En San Pablo encontramos expresiones similares: por una parte, se puede leer en sus cartas que “Cristo vive en mí” , y por otra, el autor de los Hechos de los Apóstoles pone en su boca que “en Dios vivimos, nos movemos y somos” . Este doble modo de concebir la relación de Dios con la realidad creada, con el cosmos y con el ser humano, resulta paradójico y es una provocación para el pensamiento.¿Dios está en la realidad, se hace presente en ella de algún modo, o es más bien la realidad la que está en Dios? Posiblemente no hay contradicción entre ambas imágenes, sino complementariedad. Tomás de Aquino, como veremos, afirma las dos cosas. Dios es de una naturaleza tal que, por una parte puede hacerse presente en la realidad mundana y humana y, por otra, llevar dentro de sí estas mismas realidades. ¿Hay alguna analogía, alguna imagen que pueda servir para describir una naturaleza así y ayudarnos a comprender mejor el ser divino? En definitiva, ¿qué significa “estar en” o “dentro de” las criaturas por parte de Dios y en o dentro de Dios por parte de las criaturas? ¿Se trata de simples imágenes o estas imágenes son modelos que tienen alguna correspondencia con la realidad?When you read the accounts that the great saints do of their experience of God, you find expressions that break the rules of linguistic logic, what proves that there are experiences not easy to describe and transmit. St Augustine in the context of one of the most known pages of his Confessions, where he exclaims: “Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new”, says that God is inside him and adds immediately after that things are inside God, since if things were not in him they wouldn’t exist. We find similar expressions in St Paul: On the one hand, one can read in one of his letters: “Christ lives in me”, on the other hand, the author of the Acts of the Apostles puts in his mouth: “in God we live and move and have our being” . This double way of understanding God’s relation to created things, the cosmos and human beings, is paradoxical and becomes a provocation to reason.Is God inside reality, is he present in it someway, or is rather reality which is in God? Possibly there is not contradiction between the two images, but they complement each other. Thomas Aquinas, as we’ll see later, states the two. God is such a nature, that, on the one hand, he can be present in wordly and human reality, on the other hand, he can contain inside himself these realities. Is there any analogy, any image able to describe a nature like this that could help us to understand better his divine being? In short, what does it mean to be in or inside the creatures in relation to God and to be in or inside God in relation to creatures? Is it about simple images or these images are models with some relation to reality? (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino comienza su síntesis teológica definitiva preguntándose por la legitimidad y necesidad de la teología. Inmediatamente después se plantea la pregunta por sus contenidos: ¿de qué trata la ciencia teológica? Si la teología es la ciencia de la Revelación y su fundamento está en la revelación que Dios en Cristo hace de sí mismo, parece que su contenido tiene que ser Dios mismo. Un contenido que solo es cognoscible si Dios se da a conocer, porque el ser humano, (...) con sus fuerzas, con su sola razón, solo puede alcanzarle de forma limitada y parcial, en suma, solo puede saber de su existencia, pero no de sus designios, de sus intenciones y mucho menos de su naturaleza.Para Sto. Tomás es claro que Dios es el sujeto, el contenido de la Teología. Esta ciencia es un “tratado sobre Dios”. Ahora bien, Tomás de Aquino es consciente de una dificultad: si el fundamento de la Teología es la Sagrada Escritura, que es el lugar en el que se contiene la Revelación de Dios, resulta que “en la Sagrada Escritura se trata de muchas cosas además de Dios, como son las criaturas y los actos humanos”. Tomás de Aquino resuelve la dificultad argumentando que Dios es el sujeto de la teología no exactamente por ser su único contenido o por ser el único sujeto del que trata esta ciencia, sino porque todo lo que ella trata “lo hace teniendo como punto de mira a Dios, bien porque se trata de Dios mismo, bien porque se trata de algo referido a él como principio y como fin”.Thomas Aquinas begins his definitive theological synthesis asking for legitimacy and need of theology. Immediately he asks for the contents: what is theological science about? If theology is the science of Revelation, and its foundation is the revelation that God makes of himself in Christ, it seems that its content must be God himself1. A content that can only be known, if God shows himself, because a human being, with its strength and its sole mind, only can get him in a limited and partial way, in short, it can only know of his existence, but not his plans, his intentions, and even less, his nature.For St Thomas it is clear that God is the subject, the content of theology. This science is a “treatise about God”. However, Thomas Aquinas is conscious of a difficulty: If Sacred Scripture that is the place where God’s revelation is contained, is the foundation of theology, “it turns out that Sacred Scripture deals with many more things besides God, that is, creatures and human acts”. Thomas Aquinas will solve this difficulty arguing that God is the subject of theology not because he is exactly the only content or subject of this science, but because all it deals with, “is done with reference to God himself either because it is about God or about something referred to God as beginning and end”. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

De auteur van dit artikel argumenteert dat het verschil tussen de continentale en de analytische traditie niet kan worden afgeleid uit het werk zelf van de filosofen, maar dat 'continentale filosofie' en 'analytische filosofie' een stempel is dat er van buitenaf wordt opgedrukt.

Milieufilosofisch Nederland wordt momenteel verdeeld door een controverse naar aanleiding vanrecente publicaties van de Wageningse filosofen Keulartz en Korthals. In dit artikel wil ik - aande hand van een analyse van het gebruik van het natuurbegrip bij Wim Zweers - laten zien dat Keulartz op een tot nu toe onderbelicht probleem wijst: het probleem van de veelheid vannatuurbeelden. Tegelijkertijd wil ik echter aantonen dat Keulartz' eigen, 'post-naturalistische' positie op een tegenspraak berust. Tenslotte geef ik aan hoe deze controverses zijn terug (...) tevoeren op een onvermijdelijke spanning in onze morele omgang met de natuur, en zoek ik naar een manier waarop deze spanning binnen de milieu-ethiek vruchtbaar kan worden gemaakt. (shrink)

Når man går i gang med et forskningsprojekt, vil der typisk være nogle forskningsetiske problemstillinger, man skal forholde sig til. Det kan fx være, at man skal have indhentet informeret samtykkeerklæringer fra de deltagere, der skal være med, eller man skal have indhentet forskningsetiske tilladelser og godkendelser fra uafhængige instanser. Det er altså overvejelser, som typisk dukker op ved begyndelsen af et forskningsprojekt. Der kan efterfølgende være en risiko for, at man forsømmer refleksioner over emergerende etiske problemstillinger, og at forskningsetik (...) således reduceres til, at man som forsker har underskrevet og overholdt nogle prædefinerede retningslinjer for god forskningspraksis. Sådanne retningslinjer er naturligvis særdeles vigtige. Men det er pointen i denne artikel, at de ikke kan stå alene. Forskningsetiske dilemmaer er et epistemologisk vilkår gennem hele forskningsprocessen, og de må således overvejes og genovervejes, forhandles og genforhandles gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Den form for forskningsetik, der følger bestemte på forhånd fastlagte retningslinjer, som typisk er formuleret i standardiserede, kontekstuafhængige principper for god etisk adfærd, benævnes i artiklen procedural forskningsetik, mens en forskningsetik, der foretager en konkret og kontekstafhængig vurdering af de specifikke etiske problemstillinger og dilemmaer, som de viser sig i praksis gennem hele forskningsprocessen, benævnes kasuistisk forskningsetik. Distinktionen mellem disse to typer forskningsetik er udtryk for en teoretisk konstruktion, og de skal ikke betragtes som modsatrettede alternativer, men derimod som supplerende sider ved god forskningsetisk praksis. I artiklen diskuteres forholdet mellem dem for ad den vej at fremhæve enhver forskers pågående og kontinuerlige ansvar gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Nøgleord: forskningsetik, procedural, kasuistisk, Leibniz English summary: Dic cur hic – a casuistic research ethic When embarking on a research project, researchers must customarily confront some ethical issues. To begin with, they may need informed consent from the participants, or research ethics permission and approval from an independent Research Ethics Committee. However, there is more involved than these legal requirements alone, for just complying with some pre-defined guidelines for good research practice is by no means enough. In fact, a number of ethical issues demanding thorough reflection may emerge during the research project. Far from being neglected, such questions deserve careful attention. Research ethical dilemmas are an epistemological condition throughout the whole research process, and must therefore be constantly considered and reviewed, negotiated and renegotiated. This article purports to categorize the ethical issues likely to arise during the course of an investigation into two main types, namely procedural and casuistic. The kind of research ethics following certain pre-established guidelines, which are typically expressed in standardized, context-independent principles of good ethical behavior, will be labeled as procedural research ethics, while the type of research ethics ensuing from the analysis and contextual assessment of the specific dilemmas arising in practice in the particular situation studied, will be named casuistic research ethics. A distinction between these two types of research ethics reflects a theoretical construct. Both types should not be regarded as opposing alternatives, but as complementary aspects of good ethical research practices. This article discusses the relationship between the two types in order to highlight the researcher’s ongoing and continuous responsibility throughout the research process. (shrink)

Moraal was sinds mensenheugenis het exclusieve domein van filosofie en theologie, totdat bioloog Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871) als eerste opperde: ‘Elk dier dat met uitgesproken sociale instincten is toegerust (…) zou onvermijdelijk een moraal of geweten verwerven zodra zijn intellectuele vermogens even goed of bijna even goed ontwikkeld zouden zijn als die van de mens.’ Pas een eeuw later kwam het onderzoek naar moraal goed op gang in empirische wetenschapsdisciplines als biologie, ethologie, culturele antropologie, psychologie en (...) neurowetenschappen. De getemde mens laat zien hoe ver de fascinerende inzichten die dat onderzoek al heeft opgeleverd, zijn doorgedrongen in Vlaanderen en Nederland. Meer dan 140 bekende en onbekende personen met uiteenlopende culturele en levensbeschouwelijke achtergronden laten in dit boek hun gedachten gaan over de vraag waar onze moraal vandaan komt. Primatoloog Frans de Waal wijdt aan deze centrale vraag een uitvoerig essay, terwijl schooldirecteur en expert radicalisering Karin Heremans een stem laat horen uit de multiculturele onderwijspraktijk. Filosoof Guido Vanheeswijck en moraalwetenschapper Dirk Verhofstadt geven niet alleen zelf antwoord op de vraag waar onze moraal vandaan komt, maar lazen alle bijdragen en schreven naar aanleiding daarvan een slotessay. (shrink)

In this work we address the proposition that because it emerges from the contract tradition and so relies upon the assumption of mutual advantage, John Rawls' theory of “Justice as Fairness” cannot accommodate persons with severe mental and/or physical impairments. We respond to this criticism by proposing a revision to Rawls' contracting situation, the Original Position . Specifically, we propose to supplant the traditional understanding of mutual advantage—which we agree does constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for deliberation to come (...) about in the OP, as it stands—with a more modest alternative: a Hobbes-inspired concept that we call minimal mutual advantage. We argue that when this revision is introduced into Justice as Fairness, it reconciles admirably the seeming tension between contractarianism’s insistence on the rational, self-interested actor and the reality of societies in which not all members are capable of meeting a standard of reciprocity understood in terms of productive contributions to the general well-being. In so doing, minimal mutual advantage renders indistinguishable the disabled from the able in the OP, allowing Justice as Fairness to capture successfully problems of disability while leaving intact the more appealing aspects of liberalism that other approaches would dismiss. (shrink)

In seinem Werk "Philosophie als Lebensform" vertritt Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) die These, dass die Philosophie bis zu Beginn der hochmittelalterlichen Scholastik nicht primar Wissenschaft mit Anspruch auf systematische Stimmigkeit und Objektivitat sei, sondern auf einen psychologisch-padagogischen Effekt fur die Lebenspraxis abziele: Die Philosophie der hellenistischen und romischen Epoche stellt sich als eine Lebensweise, eine Lebenskunst und eine Seinsweise dar. Es geht darum, das Sein des Menschen zu verwandeln und ihm zum Gluck zu verhelfen. Das fruhe Christentum sowie das mittelalterliche Monchtum (...) knupften daran an und verstanden das spirituelle Leben als philosophia, die durch die Praxis geistiger Ubungen in Christus den alten Menschen ablegt und den neuen anzieht (vgl. Eph 4,22-24). In der Mystik, die seit Dionysius Areopagita (ca. 500 n. Chr.) zu einem expliziten Inhalt des Denkens wird, spitzt sich dieses Spannungsverhaltnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu. Per definitionem ist Mystik eine uberwaltigende Erfahrung, die alle Affekte involviert. Aber genau diese Erfahrung wird schon in der vorchristlichen griechischen Philosophie zum Inhalt einer rationalen Reflexion. Dementsprechend oszilliert der Begriff einer theologia mystica zwischen unmittelbarem Erleben und systematischer Theorie. Mit Beitragen von Rolf Darge, Lioba Fau OSB, Paul D. Hellmeier OP, Johannes Herzgsell SJ, William J. Hoye, Johann Kreuzer, Isabelle Mandrella, Johannes Schaber OSB, Christian Schafer, Peter Sloterdijk, Wolfgang Speyer und Martin Thurner. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Opstellen over de invloed van de Duitse filosoof (1889-1976) op de filosofie in Nederland. Bevat bibliografie.

Vryheid is naas regverdiging een van die belangrikste temas van die Reformatoriese teologie. Luther se geskrif 'Oor die vryheid van 'n Christenmens' is een van sy hoofgeskrifte. In hierdie geskrif beskryf hy die vryheid van die innerlike en die uiterlike mens. Die innerlike mens is vry en niemand se onderdaan nie. Die uiterlike mens is weer elke ander mens se onderdaan en dienskneg. Die Christen dien sy medemens deur die liefde. Luther se verstaan van naasteliefde word vanuit ander geskrifte toegelig. (...) Johannes Calvyn se verstaan van vryheid volgens sy 'Institusie' van 1559 word ook bespreek. Daar word op die groot ooreenstemming tussen Luther en Calvyn gewys. Die verskille tussen die twee Reformatore is minimaal. Calvyn het egter wel groter aandag aan die adiafora-vraagstuk gegee. Daar word ook deurgaans na Philipp Melanchthon se invloed op Calvyn gewys. Die relevansie van die vryheidsvraagstuk lê nie in die instrumentalisering van die Christelike vryheid nie, maar in die hernude bestudering van die klassieke tekste met die bedoeling om die belangrike reformatoriese motiewe te herontdek. Hierdie motiewe is relevant - ook in ons samelewing. (shrink)

Do firms gain environmental legitimacy when they conform to external expectations regarding the natural environment? Drawing on institutional logic and signaling theory, we investigate sources of heterogeneity in the impacts of environmental actions on environmental legitimacy. Longitudinal data about 325 publicly traded U.S. firms in polluting industries support the notion that environmental actions help firms gain environmental legitimacy. However, some actions instead can harm this legitimacy if environmental performance deteriorates and the firm is subject to intense scrutiny from nongovernmental organizations. (...) Thus, an important contribution of this research is to identify conditions under which greenwashing can backfire. (shrink)

The Routledge International Handbook of Neuroaesthetics is an authoritative reference work that provides the reader with a wide-ranging introduction to this exciting new scientific discipline. The book brings together leading international academics to offer a well-balanced overview of this burgeoning field while addressing two questions central to the field; how the brain computes aesthetic appreciation for sensory objects, and how is art created and experienced.

Online supplement, "Mulsow: Additions to Notes drawn from the 2002 edition of Moderne aus dem Untergrund" full versions of nearly 300 notes that were truncated in the print edition. Hosted on H. C. Erik Midelfort's website. Martin Mulsow's seismic reinterpretation of the origins of the Enlightenment in Germany won awards and renown in its original German edition, and now H. C. Erik Midelfort's translation makes this sensational book available to English-speaking readers. In Enlightenment Underground, Mulsow shows that even in the (...) late seventeenth century some thinkers in Germany ventured to express extremely dangerous ideas, but did so as part of a secret underground. Scouring manuscript collections across northern Europe, Mulsow studied the writings of countless hitherto unknown radical jurists, theologians, historians, and dissident students who pushed for the secularization of legal, political, social, and religious knowledge. Often their works circulated in manuscript, anonymously, or as clandestinely published books. Working as a philosophical microhistorian, Mulsow has discovered the identities of several covert radicals and linked them to circles of young German scholars, many of whom were connected with the vibrant radical cultures of the Netherlands, England, and Denmark. The author reveals how radical ideas and contributions to intellectual doubt came from Socinians and Jews, church historians and biblical scholars, political theorists, and unemployed university students. He shows that misreadings of humorous or ironic works sometimes gave rise to unintended skeptical thoughts or corrosively political interpretations of Christianity. This landmark book overturns stereotypical views of the early Enlightenment in Germany as cautious, conservative, and moderate, and replaces them with a new portrait that reveals a movement far more radical, unintended, and puzzling than previously suspected. (shrink)

The contributors represent the complete spectrum of positions between a relativism that challenges the very concept of a single world and the idea that there are ascertainable, objective universals.

Recent developments in Continental philosophy have included the emergence of a school of “speculative realism,” which rejects the human-centered orientation that has long dominated Continental thought. Proponents of speculative realism differ on several issues, but many agree on the need for an object-oriented ontology. Some speculative realists identify realism with materialism, while others accord equal reality to objects that are non-material, even fictional. Several thinkers retain a focus on difference, a well-established theme in Continental thought. This paper looks at speculative (...) realism from the perspective of systems theory. Many of the tenets of speculative realism have long been features of systems metaphysics and are expressed clearly in a systems framework. However, some views of some speculative realists differ substantially from systems theoretic ideas. (shrink)

L’addition, dans la cinquième édition en 1683 de La Logique ou L’Art de penser, d’un chapitre consacré à la définition générale du signe et de plusieurs chapitres relevant spécifiquement d’une analyse des signes linguistiques, a été parfois interprétée comme une apparition tardive du “problème du langage” dans le traité d’Arnauld et Nicole. Parce que la plupart de ces chapitres supplémentaires sont la transposition de passages auparavant destinés dans la Perpétuité de la foi (1669-1674) à réfuter le sens calviniste de Ceci (...) est mon corps, on a été enclin à attribuer l’importance de la question du signe et du “problème du langage” dans l’édition de 1683 à une origine théologique. J’essaie au contraire de montrer que, dès la première édition de L’Art de penser en 1662, la problématisation des écarts des expressions linguistiques avec une correspondance terme à terme entre les mots et les idées a été indissociable pour Port-Royal de l’analyse des opérations de l’esprit. Selon moi, dans la Perpétuité de la foi, la critique du sens calviniste de la formule eucharistique constitue elle-même une application de cette analyse logique du langage : les passages incorporés ensuite dans L’Art de penser sont dans le prolongement des réflexions de 1662 sur les difficultés d’adéquation entre le dire et le vouloir-dire. Je montre pour finir que la définition générale du signe à Port-Royal suppose une restructuration de la définition augustinienne du De doctrina christiana, et fonde en 1683 une identification de la relation de signification linguistique à un rapport de représentation des mots aux idées, qui vient redoubler le rapport de représentation des idées aux choses établi en 1662. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and (...) the companion volume Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives. (shrink)

Anthony Kenny concludes The God of the Philosophers by saying that ‘If the argument of the previous chapters has been correct then there is no such being as the God of traditional natural theology … There cannot, if our argument has been sound, be a timeless, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent all-good being’ . According to Kenny.